社会秩序是什么、从何而来,以及社会规范和正式法律的关系历来是法理学研究的重要命题。与传统的法哲学研究进路不同,埃里克森在田野调查的基础上运用信息经济学和博弈论的工具确立了民间规范是社会秩序的根本以及正式法律的源头这一普遍性命题。但本文不同意埃里克森的研究成功挑战了科斯定理。通过对科斯《社会成本问题》一文的细致解读,认为科斯之所以忽略个人伦理和民间规范这两种有效预防和解决纠纷的制度,是因为该文中引发科斯定理的案例大都发生在资本主义经济急剧转型时代,涉及的纠纷双方当事人几乎没有重复博弈的可能,邻里规范当然就不可能生发和起作用。以一种社会控制理论的视野,正式法律和社会规范各有其适用的范围和边界。 What is social order, where come from, and the relationship between social norms and formal law have always been the important propositions of jurisprudence research. Different from the traditional legal philosophical research approach, based on the field investigation, Erikson uses the tools of information economics and game theory to establish the universal proposition that folk norms are the root of social order and the source of formal law. However, this article does not agree that the success of Erichsen’s research challenges Coase’s theorem. Through the careful reading of Coase’s article, “The Problem of Social Costs”, it is concluded that the reason why Coase ignores the two systems of individual ethics and non-governmental regulation in preventing and settling disputes is that most of the cases that led to Coase ’s theorem occurred in the rapid capitalist economy In the transitional era, the parties involved in the dispute have almost no possibility of repeating the game, of course, the neighborhood norms can not germinate and play a role. With a view of social control theory, both formal law and social norms have their own scope and boundaries.