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管理者可信行为作为管理者的一种意志行为,能够建立和增强员工对管理者的信任,激励员工提高其努力水平,进而提高个人绩效和组织绩效。运用实验经济学方法,通过设计事前激励契约和惩罚契约两种薪酬契约分别反映管理者实施可信行为和实施不可信行为的实验环境,研究检验管理者可信行为对具有不同互惠倾向的员工的激励作用和效率。实验结果表明,管理者实施可信行为能得到比不实施可信行为更高的员工努力水平和收益。在管理者实施可信行为的情况下,具有较高正互惠倾向的员工将付出比具有较低正互惠倾向的员工更高的努力水平;在管理者实施不可信行为的情况下,具有较高负互惠倾向的员工将付出比具有较低负互惠倾向的员工更低的努力水平。
Manager’s credible behavior acts as a kind of will of the manager to establish and strengthen the trust of the employee in the manager, motivate the employee to improve their level of effort, and then improve individual performance and organizational performance. Using the experimental economics approach, the two types of compensation contracts designed beforehand to stimulate contract and punish contract reflect the experimental environment in which the manager implements credible behavior and implements untrustworthy behavior, respectively, and examines the credible behavior of managers in employees with different reciprocity tendencies. Motivation and efficiency. The experimental results show that managers’ implementation of credible behavior can result in higher levels of employee effort and benefits than non-credible behavior. In the case of managers implementing credible behaviors, employees with a higher positive reciprocity tendency will pay higher levels of effort than those with a lower positive reciprocity tendency; in the case of managers performing untrustworthy behavior, they have a higher level of Negative reciprocal employees will pay lower effort than employees with lower negative reciprocity.