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In recent years， policy makers and policy researchers inside China have debated if China will fall into the so-called“middle income trap，” which essentially refers to an economic phenomenon where a country which attains a certain income level （due to given advantages） will become stuck at that level. I am not going to discuss whether China will fall into this trap. My point is that the Chinese leadership is acutely aware of this possibility. China has showed many signs of this trap. But with this keen level of awareness， China has started to search for various strategies to avoid the trap， introducing new industrial processes， finding new markets to maintain export growth， and more importantly， ramping up domestic demand.
In my view， the biggest challenge for China is still political， namely， the survival of the Communist Party of China （CPC）. As many have pointed out， the CPC can be brought down by corruption， internal party struggles， and massive social unrest. However， China’s experience since the reform shows that many problems the CPC has encountered are developmental in nature. Unlike many other developing countries which do not have the pillar of governance， China’s strength is the existence of the CPC. Overall， it is a fast learning organization， learning from other countries and from its own past. The current anti-corruption campaign is a good case.
It is important to note that engaging anti-corruption is the minimum requirement for the survival of the CPC. More important is that the CPC has to innovate itself by setting up new sets of institutions. The leadership is fully aware of this. The evolution of the CPC since the reform and opening up has its own reasons.
In the past three decades， the CPC has transformed into an increasingly open party system. This differentiates the CPC from other communist parties in the Eastern bloc before they collapsed. After the fall of Soviet Union， Eastern European states have taken the Western path， allowing different interests to found different political parties. To avoid the misfortune of party collapse， the CPC has chosen a different way by opening up the political process to all social and interests groups.
Openness is becoming an important feature of China’s party system. Any political system that is not open will become exclusive and closed. Only with openness can politics be inclusive. In the West， political openness materializes through external pluralism， i.e.， multi-party politics， in which each kind of interest can find representation in a party. In China， political openness is realized through a set of mechanisms of what I call “internal pluralism” which means the openness of the ruling party. When different interests emerge in society， the ruling party opens itself to them， absorbing them into the system and representing their interests through different institutions and mechanisms.
The institutional transformation of the CPC has been very rapid. Since no opposition party is allowed， for any social groups， entering into the political process of the CPC is the most efficient way to express their interests. Today， China’s increasingly large middle class， including private entrepreneurs， has demonstrated very strong demand for political participation. This is why the ruling party kept pace with the times by not only providing constitutional protection to nonstate-owned sectors， including private enterprises， but also allowing and encouraging private entrepreneurs to join the ruling party. The change in the nature of party membership is an indicator. Since the reform period， intellectuals， professionals and the newly risen social stratum have made up an increasing proportion of members in the party. After the successful incorporation of private entrepreneurs into the party and the political process， the CPC has now begun to put an emphasis on “social governance” to expand its ruling foundation by absorbing more social forces， which have gained significant growth and development in the past decades. As the social base of the CPC enlarges， the demand for intra-party democracy has also increased.
Nevertheless， the effectiveness of such internal pluralist openness is no less than that of any other system. Internal pluralism has differentiated China from regimes in the Arabic world where most regimes are closed， with one family （monarchy） or a few families chronically monopolizing political power and dominating the country. The number of people entering into politics from lower social levels is much larger in China than many other countries. The rule of the CPC is not based on a political family. It is a mass party with highly diversified interests.
A key feature of China’s party system is that political openness has facilitated the rapid alternation of political elite in a highly institutionalized manner. The nature of Western democracy is to realize peaceful alternation of political elites through periodical elections. China has steadfastly refused to follow the path of Western democracy； instead， it has developed a very efficient system of power succession. The late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping was successful in establishing a number of important political institutions， including term limits， age limits and collective leadership.
Both the term limits and mandatory retirement ages have enabled Chinese political elites to turn over at an extremely fast pace and can thus effectively reflect generational changes and changes of interests. A third institution is ruthless meritocracy. Indeed， voting has also come to China and it is becoming increasingly important to test one’s popularity among his/her colleagues or among the people. However， before voting， there is the additional process of selecting. One has to meet all requirements such as education， working experiences （in different parts of the country and at different bureaucratic levels）， and many other performance indicators. Actually， China has operated as a meritocracy for several thousand years， and the CPC has increasingly relied on this system for its talent recruitment. A fourth institution is the so-called “collective leadership” or“intra-party democracy.” The institution was designed by the late Deng Xiaoping. Such a system is characterized by internal pluralism. There are serious checks and balances on the highest leader- ship of the CPC. The Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee， China’s highest and most powerful decision-making body， is often regarded as the symbol of highly centralized political system or authoritarianism. However， its members have almost equal power， with each having his specific decision-making area and having the most important say in that area. Some China scholars call this system “collective presidency，”meaning that major decisions are collectively made.
It is worthwhile to mention another important feature of China’s political party system， namely， its conduciveness to prompt policy changes. Although the Chinese society often complains that the ruling party is too slow in making policy changes， they are implemented on a more rapid basis than other political systems. From the 1980s to the 1990s and to this century， China has achieved several significant policy changes. It will be difficult to understand the huge changes in China in these decades without taking into account the ruling party’s immense ability to respond to situations with appropriate policy changes.
All these changes have so far enabled the CPC to remain open. It is worth noting that while the CPC continues to oppose any Western style democracy， namely， a multiparty system， it has accommodated different elements from democracy such as intraparty voting， decentralization and political consultation.
Equally important is that drastic changes have also occurred at the societal level. It is true that the Chinese people do not enjoy Western-style political freedoms. But this should not blind us to the fact that there has been an explosion of personal freedoms.
Democracy has many advantages. But democracy does not fall from the sky. China has learned from successful experiences of democracies in the West and tragedies of democracies in the developing world. In the post-Mao era， China has been regarded as a “learning state.” “Learning from other countries” has been the major source of China’s progress. Equally important is that China has also learned from the failure of other countries.
As a “learning state，” China has actually been quite innovative in reforming its political institutions. Drastic social and economic changes must be accompanied by similar drastic political changes. Marx is still right. And I think we cannot deny that China has a right to explore its own political path. It is good not only for China itself， but also for other countries， particularly the developing world. In an age of democratic crisis in both the developed West and the developing world， China’s institutional experiment is becoming particularly meaningful. Its experiment may shed useful lessons for other countries.
In my view， the biggest challenge for China is still political， namely， the survival of the Communist Party of China （CPC）. As many have pointed out， the CPC can be brought down by corruption， internal party struggles， and massive social unrest. However， China’s experience since the reform shows that many problems the CPC has encountered are developmental in nature. Unlike many other developing countries which do not have the pillar of governance， China’s strength is the existence of the CPC. Overall， it is a fast learning organization， learning from other countries and from its own past. The current anti-corruption campaign is a good case.
It is important to note that engaging anti-corruption is the minimum requirement for the survival of the CPC. More important is that the CPC has to innovate itself by setting up new sets of institutions. The leadership is fully aware of this. The evolution of the CPC since the reform and opening up has its own reasons.
In the past three decades， the CPC has transformed into an increasingly open party system. This differentiates the CPC from other communist parties in the Eastern bloc before they collapsed. After the fall of Soviet Union， Eastern European states have taken the Western path， allowing different interests to found different political parties. To avoid the misfortune of party collapse， the CPC has chosen a different way by opening up the political process to all social and interests groups.
Openness is becoming an important feature of China’s party system. Any political system that is not open will become exclusive and closed. Only with openness can politics be inclusive. In the West， political openness materializes through external pluralism， i.e.， multi-party politics， in which each kind of interest can find representation in a party. In China， political openness is realized through a set of mechanisms of what I call “internal pluralism” which means the openness of the ruling party. When different interests emerge in society， the ruling party opens itself to them， absorbing them into the system and representing their interests through different institutions and mechanisms.
The institutional transformation of the CPC has been very rapid. Since no opposition party is allowed， for any social groups， entering into the political process of the CPC is the most efficient way to express their interests. Today， China’s increasingly large middle class， including private entrepreneurs， has demonstrated very strong demand for political participation. This is why the ruling party kept pace with the times by not only providing constitutional protection to nonstate-owned sectors， including private enterprises， but also allowing and encouraging private entrepreneurs to join the ruling party. The change in the nature of party membership is an indicator. Since the reform period， intellectuals， professionals and the newly risen social stratum have made up an increasing proportion of members in the party. After the successful incorporation of private entrepreneurs into the party and the political process， the CPC has now begun to put an emphasis on “social governance” to expand its ruling foundation by absorbing more social forces， which have gained significant growth and development in the past decades. As the social base of the CPC enlarges， the demand for intra-party democracy has also increased.
Nevertheless， the effectiveness of such internal pluralist openness is no less than that of any other system. Internal pluralism has differentiated China from regimes in the Arabic world where most regimes are closed， with one family （monarchy） or a few families chronically monopolizing political power and dominating the country. The number of people entering into politics from lower social levels is much larger in China than many other countries. The rule of the CPC is not based on a political family. It is a mass party with highly diversified interests.
A key feature of China’s party system is that political openness has facilitated the rapid alternation of political elite in a highly institutionalized manner. The nature of Western democracy is to realize peaceful alternation of political elites through periodical elections. China has steadfastly refused to follow the path of Western democracy； instead， it has developed a very efficient system of power succession. The late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping was successful in establishing a number of important political institutions， including term limits， age limits and collective leadership.
Both the term limits and mandatory retirement ages have enabled Chinese political elites to turn over at an extremely fast pace and can thus effectively reflect generational changes and changes of interests. A third institution is ruthless meritocracy. Indeed， voting has also come to China and it is becoming increasingly important to test one’s popularity among his/her colleagues or among the people. However， before voting， there is the additional process of selecting. One has to meet all requirements such as education， working experiences （in different parts of the country and at different bureaucratic levels）， and many other performance indicators. Actually， China has operated as a meritocracy for several thousand years， and the CPC has increasingly relied on this system for its talent recruitment. A fourth institution is the so-called “collective leadership” or“intra-party democracy.” The institution was designed by the late Deng Xiaoping. Such a system is characterized by internal pluralism. There are serious checks and balances on the highest leader- ship of the CPC. The Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee， China’s highest and most powerful decision-making body， is often regarded as the symbol of highly centralized political system or authoritarianism. However， its members have almost equal power， with each having his specific decision-making area and having the most important say in that area. Some China scholars call this system “collective presidency，”meaning that major decisions are collectively made.
It is worthwhile to mention another important feature of China’s political party system， namely， its conduciveness to prompt policy changes. Although the Chinese society often complains that the ruling party is too slow in making policy changes， they are implemented on a more rapid basis than other political systems. From the 1980s to the 1990s and to this century， China has achieved several significant policy changes. It will be difficult to understand the huge changes in China in these decades without taking into account the ruling party’s immense ability to respond to situations with appropriate policy changes.
All these changes have so far enabled the CPC to remain open. It is worth noting that while the CPC continues to oppose any Western style democracy， namely， a multiparty system， it has accommodated different elements from democracy such as intraparty voting， decentralization and political consultation.
Equally important is that drastic changes have also occurred at the societal level. It is true that the Chinese people do not enjoy Western-style political freedoms. But this should not blind us to the fact that there has been an explosion of personal freedoms.
Democracy has many advantages. But democracy does not fall from the sky. China has learned from successful experiences of democracies in the West and tragedies of democracies in the developing world. In the post-Mao era， China has been regarded as a “learning state.” “Learning from other countries” has been the major source of China’s progress. Equally important is that China has also learned from the failure of other countries.
As a “learning state，” China has actually been quite innovative in reforming its political institutions. Drastic social and economic changes must be accompanied by similar drastic political changes. Marx is still right. And I think we cannot deny that China has a right to explore its own political path. It is good not only for China itself， but also for other countries， particularly the developing world. In an age of democratic crisis in both the developed West and the developing world， China’s institutional experiment is becoming particularly meaningful. Its experiment may shed useful lessons for other countries.