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道德实在论是具有本体论取向的非虚无主义的伦理认知主义形式,其否认了道德命题的真理价值,又被进一步划分为强、中、弱模式。与之对应的道德反实在论认为,道德命题的“真”与“假”是无法被认识和确证的。作为一种范式,道德怀疑论主要涉及认识论道德怀疑论、非认知主义和道德误差理论,旨在反道德客观主义,而道德反实在论从内涵上涉及投射主义、语义学的表达主义以及误差理论,特别体现在怪异性论证和相对性论证逻辑上。另外,从本质上来说,道德实在论同道德虚无主义存在一定的区别。
Moral realism is a non-nihilistic ethnocognitive form with ontological orientation. It denies the truth value of moral propositions and is further divided into strong, medium and weak modes. Corresponding moral anti-realism holds that the “truth” and the “falseness” of moral propositions can not be recognized and confirmed. As a paradigm, moral skepticism mainly involves epistemological theories of moral skepticism, non-cognitivism and moral error, which are aimed at anti-moral objectivism, whereas ethical anti-realism involves projecting doctrine, semanticist expressionism and error Theory, especially in the logic of weirdness argument and relativity argument. In addition, there is a certain difference between moral realism and morals nihilism in essence.