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随着互联网的迅速发展,零售商日益盛行开辟网络销售渠道,零售商双渠道供应链成为一种趋势。文章在政府创新补贴研究基础上构建了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的零售商双渠道斯塔克伯格博弈模型,研究政府创新补贴对供应链的影响。研究结果表明:政府创新补贴能有效激励制造商进行创新,增加政府创新补贴能拉动供应链整体利润的增长;通过算例对研究问题进行了深入探讨,并给出了政府效用最大化时政府应该设置的创新补贴激励系数。研究结论可为政府制定合理决策提供理论依据和有效参考。
With the rapid development of the Internet, retailers are increasingly prevalent in developing online sales channels, and the retailers’ dual-channel supply chain has become a trend. Based on the research of government innovation allowance, the article constructs a two-channel Starkberg game model of retailer composed of a manufacturer and a retailer to study the influence of government innovation subsidy on the supply chain. The results show that government innovation subsidy can effectively encourage manufacturers to innovate and increase government innovation subsidies to boost the overall profit growth of the supply chain. Through case studies, the issue of research is discussed in depth and the government should maximize the effectiveness of the government should Set the innovation subsidy incentive coefficient. The conclusions of the study can provide a theoretical basis and an effective reference for the government to make rational decisions.