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本文研究由单零售商单制造商组成的二级供应链。当市场需求和现货价格同时不确定时,零售商既可以通过长期合同与期权合同从制造商处购买产品,也可以通过现货市场交易获得产品以满足市场需求。通过建立制造商和零售商间的Stackelberg博弈模型,得到零售商的最优采购决策并进一步分析了解的性质。给出了制造商长期合同的最优定价区间、最优期权执行价格和最优生产决策,证明了均衡解的存在。最后算例表明制造商期权生产比例随着期权执行价格的升高而增加,且期权执行价格在适价区间时,能够达到最优。
This article looks at a two-stage supply chain made up of single-retailer singles manufacturers. When both market demand and spot price are uncertain at the same time, retailers can purchase products from manufacturers through long-term contracts and option contracts, and can also obtain products through spot market to meet market demand. By establishing the Stackelberg game model between manufacturer and retailer, the retailer’s optimal purchasing decision is obtained and the nature of the understanding is further analyzed. The optimal pricing interval, the optimal option price and the optimal production decision are given for the manufacturer’s long-term contract, which proves the existence of the equilibrium solution. The last example shows that the ratio of manufacturer’s option production increases with the execution price of option, and the option execution price can be optimized when it is in the optimal range.