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近年来中国政府内部监督成果不容乐观,对官员监督多从外部监督入手,专家及银行监管作为社会监督的一部分对政府内部监督亦有其参与其中的必要性。本文指出,权力制衡一直是政治学界研究限制官员权力的重要理论,以往研究中,多关注同级官员的权力分化与制衡,忽视上级、同级、下级三个层级间的联系对官员监督的重要意义。下级对上级的匿名评定打破官本位思想禁锢的同时,也为中国官员的考绩与黜迁提供重要参考。
In recent years, the Chinese government has not been optimistic about the results of its internal oversight. From the perspective of external supervision, supervision by officials and banks as part of social supervision have also made it necessary for government internal oversight to participate. This paper points out that the checks and balances of power have always been the important theoretical basis for the political scholars to study and limit the power of officials. In the past researches, they pay more attention to the division and balance of power among officials at the same level, ignoring the importance of the links between superiors, siblings and subordinates at the supervisory level significance. While subordinates’ assessment of superiors dismisses the official-standard imprisonment, it also provides an important reference for the performance evaluation and relocation of Chinese officials.