由产权不清和政府寻租导致的企业家努力水平低下是造成乡镇企业经营困难的根本原因 ,企业改制是解决这一问题的主要手段。但是 ,如果改制仅仅局限于所有权易手 ,不去触动地方政府事后寻租的权力基础 ,不形成对产权的有效保护 ,那么考虑到政府的事后寻租 ,企业家仍然不会提供高水平的努力。只有进行政府机构改革 ,使企业家确立政府不会事后寻租的信念 ,企业家的激励问题才能真正得到解决。本文通过构造一个两阶段不完全博弈信号传递模型 ,解释了造成改制后地区间经济绩效差异的原因 ,阐明了机构改革是政府传递改制决心、企业家识别政府类型的关键信号。而是否进行政府机构改革则决定了改制的成败 The low level of entrepreneurial effort caused by unclear property rights and rent-seeking by the government is the root cause of the difficulties in the management of township enterprises. Enterprise restructuring is the main means to solve this problem. However, if the reform is limited to the change of ownership and does not touch the foundation of the rent-seeking authority of local governments and does not form effective protection of property rights, then entrepreneurs will still not provide high-level efforts after rent-seeking by the government. Only by carrying out the reform of government agencies and enabling entrepreneurs to establish the conviction that the government will not seek rent afterwards can entrepreneurs’ incentives be truly solved. This paper constructs a two-stage incomplete game signal transmission model to explain the reasons for the difference in economic performance after the reform. It clarifies that the institutional reform is the key signal that the government is determined to pass on the restructuring and the entrepreneur identifies the type of government. Whether or not the government reform will determine the success or failure of the reform