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用于弥补地方政府财力不足的纵向转移支付制度和广泛实施的新型城镇化战略对我国地方腐败水平产生了明显影响。研究立足空间视角,借助空间面板杜宾模型极大似然估计法对我国2000-2013年31个省市自治区的城镇化、转移支付与地区腐败发生率之间的关系进行了深入探讨,实证发现:城镇化通过强化地方官僚晋升预期的“基建投资”冲动和降低临近地区的引资成本而助长地区腐败;中央对地方的转移支付因产生明显的属地“粘蝇纸”效应和空间外溢效应促进了地方官僚腐败;虽然直接支撑城镇化建设缺口的转移支付有利于通过“标尺竞争”秩序约束本地腐败累积,但又会因地区间“政绩竞赛”增加官员的寻租动机。因而从腐败的诱发多重根源来看,遏制与地方政府行为直接相关的财政性因素显得更为重要。
The vertical transfer payment system and the widely implemented new urbanization strategy to make up for the lack of financial resources of local governments have had a significant impact on the level of local corruption in our country. Based on the perspective of space, this study explores the relationship between urbanization, transfer payments and the incidence of regional corruption in 31 provinces in our country from 2000 to 2013 with the help of the maximum likelihood estimation of spatial panel Dübin model. : Urbanization fosters regional corruption by strengthening local bureaucratic promotion of the expected “capital investment” impulses and reducing the cost of attracting foreign investment in the immediate area; central-to-local transfer payments have a distinct generosity and “sticky paper” effect and space The spillover effect promotes local bureaucratic corruption. Although the transfer payment directly supporting the urbanization gap is conducive to restraining the accumulation of local corruption through the “rod competition” order, rent-seeking officials will be increased because of inter-regional “performance competitions” motivation. Therefore, from the multiple root causes of corruption, it is more important to curb the financial factors that are directly related to the behavior of local governments.