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针对现有低碳供应链决策相关研究中忽略了公平偏好的问题,以Nash讨价还价解作为判断收益分配是否公平的参考标准,基于收益共享契约建立Stackelberg博弈模型,求解得到碳减排量和批发价格等供应链决策,并分析公平偏好的影响。研究发现,收益共享契约有利于供应链的碳减排;零售商和供应商的公平偏好都会促进碳减排;而且,公平偏好会影响收益共享契约的批发价格和收益共享比例两个参数的取值。因此,选择公平偏好较强的企业构建供应链,并根据自身和供应链伙伴公平偏好强度确定恰当的收益共享契约参数值,对促进供应链碳减排都具有重要意义。
In the research of low carbon supply chain decision, ignoring the problem of fair preference, Nash bargaining is taken as the reference standard to judge whether the income distribution is fair. Based on the revenue sharing contract, a Stackelberg game model is established to obtain the carbon emission reduction and the wholesale price Such as supply chain decision-making, and analyze the impact of fair preference. The research shows that the revenue-sharing contract is beneficial to carbon reduction in the supply chain. The fair preference of retailers and suppliers will promote the emission reduction of carbon. Moreover, the fair preference will affect the two parameters of the wholesale price and revenue sharing ratio of revenue-sharing contract value. Therefore, it is of great significance to choose a fair value preferred firm to build the supply chain and determine the appropriate value of the revenue-sharing contract according to the fair preference intensity of itself and the supply chain partners.