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本文构建古诺博弈模型分析开放环境下民营化程度对政府最优产业(或贸易)政策选择的影响及由此带来的社会福利的变化。核心结果表明:从最大化社会福利出发,生产补贴政策是政府的最优战略选择。最优生产补贴下,推进民营化可以提高社会福利水平。企业进行产量竞争时,最优生产补贴与民营化程度呈U型关系;进口关税与民营化程度呈正向相关关系,贸易政策下社会福利与民营化程度呈倒U型关系。企业进行价格竞争时,最优生产补贴与民营化程度呈倒U型关系。最后,探讨了生产补贴的作用。
This paper constructs a Cournot game model to analyze the influence of the degree of privatization on the government’s optimal industry (or trade) policy choice under the open environment and the changes of social welfare. The core results show that, from the perspective of maximizing social welfare, the subsidy policy is the government’s optimal strategic choice. Under the optimal production subsidy, the promotion of privatization can raise the level of social welfare. When enterprises compete for output, the optimal production subsidy and the degree of privatization show a U-shaped relationship. The import tariffs and privatization have a positive correlation, while the social welfare and privatization have an inverted U-shaped relationship under the trade policy. When enterprises compete in price, the optimal production subsidy and the degree of privatization are inverted U-shaped. Finally, the role of subsidies for production is explored.