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在分析了高级管理类创新型人才薪酬操纵现象产生的原因的基础之上,研究作为内部治理机制的内部控制对于这种薪酬操纵的作用效果。选取2008~2011年我国A股上市公司作为研究样本,运用线性回归方法,研究上市公司内部控制质量如何影响高管类创新型人才薪酬操纵的行为。研究发现:高质量的内部控制能有效抑制高管人员为增加自身薪酬而利用盈余管理操纵短期会计收益的自利行为。
Based on the analysis of the causes of the phenomenon of remuneration manipulation of innovative talents in senior management, the effect of internal control as an internal governance mechanism on such remuneration maneuvers is studied. The paper chooses the A-share listed companies in our country from 2008 to 2011 as the research sample, and uses the linear regression method to study how the quality of internal control of listed companies affects the remuneration manipulation of innovative talents in senior management. The study found that high-quality internal control can effectively curb the self-interest behavior of executives who use earnings management to manipulate short-term accounting earnings in order to increase their own salaries.