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一些哲学家认为,经过适当的发展,元伦理学非认知主义能够解决弗雷格—吉奇难题,因而仍是一个有吸引力的理论,而另外一些哲学家则坚持非认知主义不能解决这个难题。近年来,多尔主张非认知主义能否解决弗雷格—吉奇难题的争论并不重要,因为即使假设弗雷格—吉奇难题能被解决,非认知主义仍然蕴涵一个新的问题——“一厢情愿”。然而,与多尔的观点相反,最新的研究表明一厢情愿问题并不独立于弗雷格—吉奇难题,因而它也不对非认知主义构成决定性反驳。但是,一厢情愿问题仍然是非认知主义需要解决的问题,因为它表明弗雷格—吉奇难题比非认知主义者原来预想的更难解决。
Some philosophers argue that metaphysical non-cognitivism, after proper development, can solve the Frege-Gihrich problem and thus remains an attractive theory, while others insist that non-cognitivism can not be resolved This problem In recent years, Dole’s argument that non-cognitivists can solve the Frege-Gihrich problem is not important because even assuming the Frege-Gihrich problem can be solved, non-cognitivism still implicates a new problem - “wishful thinking ”. However, contrary to Dol’s point of view, the latest research shows that the wishful thinking problem is not independent of the Frege-Gihrich problem, and therefore it does not constitute a definitive refutation of non-cognitivism. However, wishful thinking remains a problem to be solved by non-cognitivists because it shows that the Frege-Gihge problem is harder to solve than the non-cognitivists originally expected.