考虑一个处于强势地位的销售商与一个拥有私人成本信息的供应商组成的二级供应链。基于不知情销售商的视角,建立了能够真实揭示供应商生产成本信息的逆向选择模型,并对最优赊销契约机制的特征进行了分析。结果表明:为了诱导供应商真实报告自身信息,高效率供应商获得了额外的信息租金;为减少该信息租金,销售商提供给低效率供应商的最优赊销契约存在扭曲,且扭曲程度与两类供应商生产成本的差距以及销售商对高效率供应商的事前信念有关。 Consider a two-tier supply chain consisting of a strong seller and a supplier with private cost information. Based on the perspective of unknowing sellers, this paper establishes a reverse selection model that can reveal the information of production cost of suppliers, and analyzes the characteristics of the optimal credit contract mechanism. The results show that in order to induce suppliers to truly report their own information, high-efficiency suppliers get additional information rent. In order to reduce the information rent, the optimal credit contract offered by vendors to low-efficiency suppliers is distorted, The gap between the production costs of a supplier of a class and the vendor’s prior beliefs about an efficient supplier.