论文部分内容阅读
银行和借款企业之间存在着信息不对称 ,这种信息不对称可能产生逆向选择问题。研究在对称信息下银企双方之间如何构造最优合同。指出在信息不对称的情况下 ,贷款银行根据信贷市场上借款企业的平均风险类型所制定的贷款价格如何产生逆向选择问题。研究了抵押担保在信贷合同的作用 ,指出担保有一定的信号显示作用 ,有利于贷款银行识别借款企业的风险类型 ,抵押可以减小贷款银行在违约情况下的损失并扩大借款企业的责任范围。在定量的基础上 ,指出可以设计贷款担保与贷款偿付负相关的贷款合约识别借款企业的风险类型 ,从而实现资金的最优配置和效用的极大化。
Asymmetric information exists between the banks and the borrower, which may result in adverse selection. To study how to construct the optimal contract between the two sides under the symmetric information. It is pointed out that in the case of asymmetric information, the loan banks will adversely choose the loan prices based on the average risk type of the borrower in the credit market. The author studies the role of collateral in credit contract, points out that collateral has a certain signal display function, which is good for lending bank to identify the risk type of the borrower. Mortgage can reduce the loss of lending bank under the condition of default and enlarge the liability scope of the borrower. On the basis of quantitative analysis, it is pointed out that the loan type can be designed to identify the risk type of the loan enterprise with the loan contract negatively related to the loan repayment, so as to maximize the allocation of funds and maximize the utility.