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本文通过构建一个包括国内企业和外资企业的非对称横向合并模型,考察了差异化产品市场下反垄断资产剥离、企业竞拍以及相关的社会福利变化和反垄断政策选择问题。研究发现,当企业资产规模不对称时,差异化产品市场横向合并的反垄断资产剥离竞拍中,市场规模大小会影响不同企业竞拍成功的可能性。当市场规模较小时,资产规模较大的企业能够竞拍成功;当市场规模较大时,不同资产规模的企业均可能竞拍成功,此时反垄断监管机构可以通过调控剥离资产的大小来影响竞拍结果。此外,无论是外资企业还是国内企业获得非负的剥离资产都会使该剥离资产的产品价格下降;而非剥离资产的产品价格变化则取决于产品差异的性质。
By constructing an asymmetric horizontal integration model that includes both domestic and foreign-funded enterprises, this paper examines the issue of antitrust divestiture, bidding for enterprises, and related social welfare changes and antitrust policy choices in differentiated product markets. The study found that when the scale of enterprise assets is asymmetric, the size of the market size will affect the possibility of successful bidding of different enterprises in the auction of antitrust assets that are horizontally merged in differentiated product markets. When the market size is small, enterprises with larger assets can bid successfully. When the market size is larger, enterprises with different asset sizes may bid successfully. At this time, the antitrust regulators may influence the bidding result by controlling the size of the divestiture assets . In addition, the acquisition of non-negative divestiture assets by both foreign-owned enterprises and domestic enterprises will result in a decrease in the price of the divestiture assets. The price changes of non-divestiture assets will depend on the nature of the product differences.