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IPO高抑价是创业板市场的显著特征之一.本文从公司治理的视角,运用信息不对称和信号理论分析创始人、创业投资与IPO抑价之间的关系并进行实证研究.研究表明,创始人通过持股数量和兼任CEO具有一定的信号传递作用,降低了IPO抑价,而创业投资降低IPO抑价的作用并不显著.创业投资都具有低价发行保证上市成功的动机,创业投资存在“只求上市,不求成长”的现象.“,”High IPO underpricing is one of the salient features of Growth Enterprises Market(GEM).Based on corporate governance views,we apply asymmetric information and signal theory to analyze the relations between the founder,VC/PE,and IPO underpricing.Then,we further the study by empirical method.The findings suggest the founder by holding certain shares and taking CEO position can send positive signal out and then mitigate IPO underpricing to some extent,but VC/PE does not enjoy similar effect.VC/PE has motivation to offer a low price to ensure IPOs' successful issuance,while the growth of the listed company after IPO is not necessarily the VC/PE's concern.