现代高管薪酬激励和盈余管理间作用机制研究以最优薪酬契约理论为核心,以管理层权力理论和机会主义盈余管理理论为支柱,结合公司治理、公司财务、企业理论、产业经济学、微观金融学和计量经济学的最新成果,不断拓展边界并且推进研究深度。本文基于制度和契约机制视角对两者相互作用动因、机理和经济后果进行了分析和评述。经验研究大多基于企业利益与管理者利益相一致的前提下来进行探讨,而聚焦于管理者出于自利动机而实施盈余管理的研究却不多。尽管文献都集中于盈余管理的报酬契约动因,但是在新的制度背景下对于高管人员的业绩报酬安排是如何诱发盈余管理行为产生,出于薪酬动因的盈余管理是否会对高管业绩薪酬产生具体作用的经验证据还比较缺乏,有待进一步探讨。 Research on the Mechanism of the Relationship between Executive Compensation Incentives and Earnings Management Based on Optimal Remuneration Contract Theory and Pillar of Managerial Power Theory and Opportunistic Earnings Management Theory. Combining with corporate governance, corporate finance, business theory, industrial economics, micro Finance and econometrics, to continue expanding boundaries and advancing research. This article analyzes and comments on the motivation, mechanism and economic consequences of their interaction based on the perspective of institution and contract mechanism. Most of the empirical studies are based on the premise that corporate interests are consistent with those of managers. However, few studies have focused on managers implementing earnings management for self motive reasons. Although the literature focuses on the incentive contract of earnings management, how does the performance compensation arrangement of senior executives induce earnings management behavior under the new institutional background, and whether the earnings management based on salary drivers will have an impact on executive performance pay The empirical evidence of the specific role is still relatively lacking and needs to be further explored.