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哈里·法兰克福的思想实验表明道德责任并不要求可供取舍的可能性,而不相容论者试图通过一系列的思想实验来反驳法兰克福的观点。本文第一部分考察了大卫·威德克试图按照道德责备的概念来反驳法兰克福的论证的背景和动机,并澄清对法兰克福的某些误解。本文第二部分表明了威德克对道德责备的理解就其合理性而论实际上取决于法兰克福自己提出的观点。可供取舍之可能性的原则的捍卫者可以转而诉诸所谓的“康德原则”来支持他们的观点。本文第三部分论述了这种尝试并不成功。总的来说,本文试图维护法兰克福的道德责任理论的一些核心要点。
Harry Frankfurt’s ideological experiments show that the moral responsibility does not require the possibility of trade-offs, and the incompatible theorists attempt to refute Frankfurt’s point of view through a series of ideological experiments. The first part of the article examines David Wedeck’s attempt to rebut the background and motivation of Frankfurt’s argument in accordance with the concept of moral blame and to clarify some of the misconceptions about Frankfurt. The second part of this paper shows that Wadek’s understanding of moral blame depends, in theory, on his own point of view. The defenders of the principle of the possibility of trade-offs can turn to the so-called “Kant principle” to support their point of view. The third part of this article deals with the unsuccessful attempt. In general, this article attempts to uphold some of the core points of Frankfurt’s moral responsibility theory.