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下属隐性信息的获取是确保上级决策者有效决策的一个重要基础,现有的研究未能解决隐性信息获取的效率与预算平衡的两难问题。本文通过确认决策者的作用,在分析模型中引入决策者成本,并借鉴政府征收“所得税”的思路,不仅解决了隐性信息获取的真实性,而且解决了原有方案未能同时兼顾的预算平衡、利润最大化以及向下属转移损失等问题。
Obtaining subordinate hidden information is an important basis for ensuring effective decision-making at higher levels. Existing research fails to solve the dilemma of the efficiency and budget balance of hidden information acquisition. By identifying the role of policy makers, this paper introduces the cost of decision-makers into the analysis model and uses the idea of “income tax” levied by the government. This not only solves the problem of the authenticity of hidden information acquisition, but also solves the problem that the original scheme can not take into account simultaneously Balance, profit maximization and transfer losses to subordinates and other issues.