一、信息不对称下的委托——代理问题首先,国家作为委托人将国有企业的经营管理权委托给经理人,这时国资委是代理人。而在委托方和代理方之间的信息不对称下极容易发生代理人损害委托人利益求取自身利益最大化的行为,即道德风险。而国家采取这种层层委托-代理的管理模式又加大了这种道德风险的概率。具体是,在国有企业 First, the information asymmetry under the commission - the agency problem First of all, the state as a principal entrusts the management of state-owned enterprises to the manager, when the SASAC is the agent. Under the information asymmetry between the principal and the agent, it is very easy for the agent to damage the interests of the principal and maximize the interests of the principal, ie moral hazard. The country to take such a layer of commission - agent management model has increased the probability of this moral hazard. Specifically, in state-owned enterprises