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近年来,一些发达国家通过TRIPS-plus条款要求与其签订自由贸易协议的发展中国家禁止平行进口,以加强知识产权保护。为使发展中国家有效应对TRIPS-plus条款,本文克服平行进口数据难以获取的缺陷,首次通过Swarm软件平台,运用Probe IPD程序模拟仿真发达国家和发展中国家有关平行进口和价格补贴政策的动态博弈过程。文章首先对1个发达国家与1个发展中国家之间的动态博弈过程进行模拟仿真,然后将参与主体扩展为N个发达国家与N个发展中国家,从而得到动态博弈均衡解;最后考虑不确定因素对均衡解的影响。研究发现,在1个发达国家与1个发展中国家的动态博弈中,发展中国家可以通过价格补贴在一定程度上打破发达国家的限制,在国际贸易中更好保护己方利益;在N个发达国家与N个发展中国家的动态博弈中,发展中国家群体与发达国家群体经济发展水平差距越小,则发展中国家通过提供价格补贴来争取平行进口权的作用相对越强。
In recent years, some developed countries have banned the parallel importation with developing countries that have signed free trade agreements with the TRIPS-plus clause to strengthen the protection of intellectual property rights. In order to effectively deal with the TRIPS-plus clauses in developing countries, this paper overcomes the defect that the parallel import data is hard to obtain. The first time simulates the dynamic game of the parallel imports and price subsidies in developed and developing countries by using the Swarm software platform and the Probe IPD program process. The article first simulates the dynamic game process between a developed country and a developing country, and then expands the participant to N developed countries and N developing countries to obtain a dynamic game equilibrium solution. Finally, Determining factors affect the equilibrium solution. The study finds that in a dynamic game between a developed country and a developing country, developing countries can break the restrictions of developed countries to some extent through price subsidies and protect their own interests better in international trade. In N developed In the dynamic game between the state and N developing countries, the smaller the gap between the developing countries and the developed countries, the stronger the developing countries’ rights to negotiate for parallel imports by providing price subsidies.