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本文将机会主义区分为积极的和消极的,将合同细分成包容性和约束力两维度,研究合同的双维度与关系规范在治理不同渠道机会主义时各自及其交互的作用。实证研究表明:①合同的包容性会同时增加渠道成员积极和消极机会主义;合同的约束力会减少渠道成员的积极机会主义;②关系规范可降低积极和消极机会主义;③关系规范可强化合同的约束力在降低积极机会主义、弱化合同的包容性在增加消极机会主义方面的作用,但在弱化合同的包容性增加积极机会主义方面并无显著效果。本文对于机会主义表现形式、治理机制设计及效力的实证研究有突出的理论启示,也为企业诊断具体的渠道机会主义、设计适宜的治理机制提供了指导性建议。
This paper divides opportunism into positive and negative, subdivides the contract into two dimensions of inclusiveness and binding force, and studies the dual dimension and relationship norms of the contract and their interactions when managing different channels of opportunism. Empirical research shows that: (1) The inclusiveness of the contract will increase both positive and negative opportunism of the channel members; the binding force of the contract will reduce the positive opportunism of the channel members; 2 the relationship specification will reduce positive and negative opportunism; 3 the relationship specification will strengthen the contract. The binding force has reduced the positive opportunism and weakened the inclusiveness of the contract in the increase of negative opportunism, but it has no significant effect in weakening the inclusiveness of the contract and increasing positive opportunism. This paper has a prominent theoretical inspiration for empirical research on the forms of opportunism expression, governance mechanism design, and effectiveness. It also provides guidance for enterprises to diagnose specific channel opportunism and design appropriate governance mechanisms.