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本文从空谈博弈和专家的社会偏好角度来分析价格外生给定的专家服务市场的低效率现象。区别于已有文献,本文认为如果市场中的部分专家存在诚信行为,他们将与逐利专家形成高信号(如患者病情较重)区间混同、低信号(如患者病情较轻)区间分离的均衡,同时导致欺骗、服务失当以及信任缺失等一系列现象。逐利专家会以概率分布的方式模仿诚实专家的行为,向消费者随机发送均值高于其真实需求的信号。同时,低于某个阈值的信号会获得消费者完全的信任,而消费者对高于此阈值的信号的信任度会随着信号的上升而下降,所以逐利专家的信号策略本质上是在获取信任与绝对收益之间的权衡。在均衡中低需求消费者获得过多的服务(如小病大治),而高需求消费者获得的服务不足(如大病小治)。最后,本文发现引入无搜索成本的竞争可以解决以上市场效率低下的问题。
This article analyzes the inefficiencies of the expert services market given by exogenous prices from the perspective of game theory and experts’ social preferences. Differing from the existing literature, this paper argues that if some experts in the market have honesty, they will form a high-signal (such as patients with severe illness) range of confusion, low signal (such as patients with mild disease) interval separation equilibrium , At the same time lead to a series of phenomena such as deception, service misconduct and lack of trust. Profit-seeking specialists mimic the behavior of honest professionals in a probabilistic manner, sending signals to consumers randomly at a higher average than their real needs. At the same time, signals below a certain threshold gain complete consumer trust, and consumers’ trust in signals above this threshold decreases as the signal rises, so the signal strategy of a profit-seeking expert is essentially Gain the balance between trust and absolute return. In the balance of low-demand consumers get too much service (such as the treatment of minor diseases), and high-demand consumers access to services (such as major illness). Finally, this paper finds that the introduction of competition without search costs can solve the above problems of inefficient market.