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进军西藏“补给重于作战”解放成都的战役刚刚结束,1950年1月2日,中共中央、中央军委发出指示:以中共中央西南局和第二野战军为主,在中共中央西北局和第一野战军配合下,于4月开始组织向西藏进军。第二野战军随即确定由第18军执行进军西藏的任务。由于西藏距内地路途遥远,交通不便,经济落后,人烟稀少,加之语言不通,向西藏进军成为一场“补养重于作战”的特殊战斗—进藏部队的给养,几乎全部要由内地筹措,随军前送。为此,1950年1月13日,刘伯承和邓小平等联名向二野发出《关于动员全军支援十八军进藏的指示》。
March 2, 1950, the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission issued a directive: With the CPC Central Committee Southwest Bureau and the Second Field Army as the mainstay, the CPC Central Committee Northwest Bureau and In cooperation with the First Field Army, the organization began marching to Tibet in April. Second Field Army immediately identified by the 18th Army into the task of entering Tibet. Since Tibet is a long way from the hinterland, inaccessible, economically backward and sparsely populated, its march into Tibet has become a “special warfare-over-combat” warfare - the supply of troops to Tibet is almost entirely financed by the Mainland, Send with the army. To this end, January 13, 1950, Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping jointly issued a letter to the second field “on mobilizing the army to support the 18 army instructions.”