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以我国2004~2012年的A股上市公司数据为样本,实证检验了高管政府背景对会计信息债务契约结构有用性的影响。研究结果表明,我国上市公司会计信息债务契约结构具有有用性,但高管政府背景,尤其是地方政府背景削弱了会计信息债务契约结构的有用性,并且这一效应在政府干预较强的地区更加显著。进一步的研究显示,利用高管政府背景获得更长的债务期限结构,反而降低了公司价值。经验证据表明,高管政府背景导致了会计信息债务契约结构有用性的降低,其根源在于政府干预影响了银行信贷决策,而非政府隐性担保的结果。
Taking the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2004 to 2012 as samples, this paper empirically tests the influence of senior government on the usefulness of debt-contractual accounting information. The result shows that the debt contract structure of accounting information of listed companies in our country is useful. However, the background of senior government, especially the background of local government, weakens the usefulness of the debt-contractual structure of accounting information, and this effect is more in areas where government intervention is stronger Significant. Further research shows that using the government background of a senior government to obtain a longer debt maturity structure actually reduces the company’s value. Empirical evidence shows that the background of executive government led to the reduction of the usefulness of the debt-contractual structure of accounting information. The root cause is that government intervention affects the bank credit decision-making, instead of the result of government implicit guarantee.