通过建立一个无限次重复博弈理论模型,得到报复性反倾销有效的条件:如果反倾销税率低于临界值且厂商重视长远利益,两国之间就会达成互不征收反倾销税的合作均衡,走出“囚徒困境”。利用美国反倾销数据进行的实证检验结果表明,现实中报复性反倾销是有效的,报复能力强的国家能够有效地抑制美国的反倾销调查,这对中国应对国外的反倾销具有重要的启示意义。 By setting up an infinite repeated game theory model, we get the valid conditions of retaliatory anti-dumping: If the anti-dumping duty is lower than the threshold and the manufacturer pays great attention to the long-term interest, the cooperative equilibrium between the two countries will be reached, Dilemma ". The empirical test using the anti-dumping data from the United States shows that the retaliatory anti-dumping is effective in the real world and the retaliatory anti-dumping investigation can be effectively suppressed in the countries with strong retaliatory ability. This is of great significance to China in coping with foreign anti-dumping.