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国内外文献从多个角度检验了管理层持股作为解决代理问题的重要手段之一的激励作用。文章以我国A股上市公司业绩预告为例,通过检验预告披露方式自愿性选择的影响来研究管理层持股对解决自愿性信息披露中代理问题的激励作用。结果发现,随着管理层持股比例和持股价值的提高,其自愿性选择的披露方式的精确性和及时性也随之提高,并更趋于稳健。结合股权分置改革的检验结果表明,改革后这一作用得到了进一步增强。总体上,文章的研究结果表明管理层持股在一定程度上能够减轻自愿性披露中的代理问题。
Domestic and foreign literatures examine the incentive function of the management shareholding as one of the important means to solve the agency problem from many angles. This paper takes the prediction of the performance of A-share listed companies in China as an example to study the incentive effect of management shareholding on the agency problem in voluntary information disclosure by examining the influence of voluntary selection of the way of disclosure. The result shows that with the increase of management shareholding proportion and shareholding value, the accuracy and timeliness of its voluntary choice disclosure method also increase, and tend to be more stable. The test results of the split share structure reform show that this role has been further strengthened after the reform. Overall, the findings of the article show that the management shareholding to a certain extent can reduce the agency problem in voluntary disclosure.