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一、引言在公司治理中,制衡股东能够对控股股东和管理层履行监督职能,抑制控股股东的机会主义行为,有利于提高企业绩效(Shleifer and Vishney,1986)。Maury和Pajuste(2005)的研究还发现,利益一致的大股东会通过合谋而非采取监督的方式掠夺中小股东财富。Gomes和Novaes(2005)的研究认为,多个大股东之间的制衡有利于解决企业经营决策中的两类委托代理问题,既能够约束管理层的自利行为,也有助于保护中小股东的利益,是一
I. INTRODUCTION In corporate governance, checks and balances between stockholders and shareholders can be supervised by controlling shareholders and management, and the opportunistic behavior of controlling shareholders can be restrained. This helps to improve corporate performance (Shleifer and Vishney, 1986). Research by Maury and Pajuste (2005) also found that large shareholders with the same interests would plunder the wealth of minority shareholders through collusion instead of supervision. The study by Gomes and Novaes (2005) argues that the checks and balances among large shareholders are helpful to solve the two types of principal-agent problems in business decision-making, which can not only restrain management\'s self-interest, but also help to protect the interests of minority shareholders. ,is one