基于委托代理关系,在征收国有资本经营预算收入的过程中,国有企业存在着较大的机会主义行为,政府作为出资人也是国有资本的委托人,因此对国有企业开展审计十分必要。通过博弈分析发现,审计覆盖率和审计处罚力度之间存在替代关系,即在审计资源一定的情况下,若审计覆盖率受限,可以通过加大处罚力度来抑制企业舞弊。另一方面,企业的决策行为还受到审计成本、审计失败风险水平的影响,当审计成本较低、审计失败风险较小时,企业舞弊的可能性较小。因此,审计部门需要在保证审计覆盖率的同时降低审计成本,保证审计成功率。 Based on the principal-agent relationship, state-owned enterprises have large opportunistic behaviors during the process of levying state-owned capital management budget revenue. As a contributor, the government is also a trustee of state-owned capital. Therefore, it is very necessary to conduct audits on state-owned enterprises. Through game analysis, it is found that there is an alternative relationship between the audit coverage and the intensity of audit punishment. That is, under the condition of certain audit resources, if the audit coverage is limited, the punishment of enterprises can be restrained by increasing the punishment. On the other hand, the decision-making behavior of enterprises is also affected by the cost of auditing and the level of risk of audit failure. When the cost of audit is low and the risk of audit failure is small, the possibility of corporate fraud is relatively small. Therefore, the audit department needs to reduce the audit cost while ensuring the audit coverage and ensure the audit success rate.