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随着我国社会保障进程的加快,养老保险统筹问题已经成为社会化进程的一大障碍。城镇职工养老保险省级统筹过程中存在的问题主要在于各级政府之间责任和利益分配的不协调。本文以委托代理模型为基础,通过对省级统筹中,各级政府利益的博弈以及省级政府对地方政府的激励约束机制的分析,认为在统筹制度设计过程中要合理分配各级政府的责任,兼顾市县政府的利益。同时分析浙江省在推进城镇职工养老保险省级统筹中各级政府间的激励约束,并提出改进路径。
With the acceleration of social security in our country, the issue of overall pension insurance has become a major obstacle to the socialization process. The problems in the co-ordination process of pension insurance for urban workers mainly lie in the uncoordinated distribution of responsibilities and benefits among the governments at all levels. Based on the principal-agent model, this paper analyzes the interests of all levels of government in provincial co-ordination and the provincial government’s incentive and restraint mechanisms, and considers that it is necessary to rationally allocate the responsibility of all levels of government in the process of co-ordinating system design , Taking into account the interests of city and county governments. At the same time, it analyzes the incentive and restraint of Zhejiang at all levels of government in promoting the overall plan of pension for urban workers and puts forward the path of improvement.