论文部分内容阅读
在单个制造商和单个零售商组成的供应链系统中,制造商为Stackelberg博弈领导者且存在资金约束,零售商为追随者。本文通过引入制造商的损失分担比和制造商给予零售商的批发价折扣率两个参数,构建了供应链模型并进行求解。研究结果表明:在制造商资金约束下,通过批发价契约无法实现供应链系统最优,而制造商与零售商签订融资补偿契约,当损失分担比以及批发价折扣率满足一定条件时,可以实现供应链协调。最后通过算例对结论进行了验证。
In a supply chain system consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, the manufacturer is a Stackelberg game leader with financial constraints and a retailer is a follower. In this paper, the supply chain model is constructed and solved by introducing the manufacturer’s loss-sharing ratio and the retailer’s wholesale discount rate. The results show that under the constraint of manufacturer funds, the optimal supply chain system can not be achieved through the wholesale price contract, and the manufacturer and retailer sign the contract of financial compensation. When the loss sharing ratio and wholesale discount rate meet certain conditions, Supply chain coordination. At last, the conclusion is verified through an example.