腐败问题一直是政治学、行政学研究的热点话题 ,本文力求用博弈论作为一种解释途径。文章认为 ,腐败实际上并不是孤立的、静止的单个权力拥有者的行为 ,而往往是公共权力的授予者 (以监督者为代表 )与权力执行者 (以官员为代表 )之间 ,以及权力执行者 (官员 )之间的一次或多次博弈的结果。要遏制腐败 ,一方面要强化对监督者的监督以免使监督者“打盹” ,另一方面从外部环境上加大对各博弈方的奖惩力度 ,改变官员策略选择的收益值 ,形成新的“纳什均衡”解 ,这样就从腐败生成与腐败传染两个源头上遏制了腐败的产生 The issue of corruption has always been a hot topic in politics and administration studies. This article seeks to use game theory as a way of explanation. The article argues that corruption is not in fact an isolated and static act of individual power owners, but is often a combination of the power of the public authority (represented by the supervisor) and the power executive (represented by the official), as well as the power The result of one or more games between executives (officials). To curb corruption, on the one hand, it is necessary to intensify the supervision over the supervisors in order to prevent the supervisors from “snoozing up”; on the other hand, the rewards and punishments of the game parties should be increased from the external environment and the return value of the officials’ strategic choices should be changed to form a new “ Nash equilibrium ”solution, thus curbing corruption from the two sources of corruption and corruption