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本文从事后的角度研究企业出现财务困境后银行贷款的动态调整。实证研究发现:(1)银行的事后监督主要通过调整长期借款实现;(2)银行调减困境公司的长期借款,对国有和民营公司的调减幅度差异不显著,国有企业在陷入困境当年有一定的信贷优惠,但是随着时间的推移优惠逐渐消失;(3)长期借款的调整是一次调整,而不是逐年调整,且调整的方向和幅度与公司财务指标显著相关;(4)长期借款调增的困境公司,其EBIT增长率明显高于调减或调平的公司。本文的研究结果表明,对首次陷入财务困境的公司,我国银行通过调整长期借款增强了对债务人的约束,已发挥其相应的公司治理作用。
This paper studies the dynamic adjustment of bank loans after the financial distress in the enterprise from the perspective of post-mortem. The empirical study found that: (1) the bank’s post-mortem supervision was mainly realized by adjusting long-term borrowings; (2) the banks reduced the long-term loans of distressed companies to the state-owned and non-state-owned companies and the difference was not significant. When state- (3) The adjustment of long-term borrowings is an adjustment rather than an annual adjustment, and the direction and magnitude of adjustment are significantly related to the financial indicators of the company; (4) The long-term borrowings Increasingly distressed companies have significantly higher EBIT growth rates than those firms that have reduced or leveled. The result of this paper shows that for the first time a company caught in financial distress, the Bank of our country has strengthened the restriction on the debtor by adjusting long-term loans and has played its corresponding corporate governance role.