本文基于欧元区内各成员国异质性这一前提,通过构建理论模型,从博弈论视角探讨了货币区成员国在三种不同情形下的政府借贷情况。结论认为,成员国政府从自身福利最大化角度进行借贷时,并不会考虑给其它成员国所带来的负外部性,从而证明了欧债危机发生的必然性。最后,从此次欧债危机的教训提出了针对我国目前财政体制改革的相关政策建议。 Based on the premise of the Heterogeneity of member states in the Eurozone, this paper explores the government lending of member states in three monetary systems from the perspective of game theory by constructing a theoretical model. The conclusion is that the governments of member countries, when borrowing from the perspective of maximizing their own welfare, will not consider the negative externalities brought about by other member countries and prove the inevitability of the European debt crisis. Finally, from the lesson of the European debt crisis, we put forward some policy suggestions for the current reform of the financial system in our country.