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波普尔的证伪主义是否真地解决了休谟的归纳问题,学界的回答通常是否定的,人们认为,波普尔所谓的证伪主义暗中引入了归纳。艾伦·马斯格雷夫于2004年为波普尔作出了辩护,这种辩护在某种意义上改变了波普尔的观点,但也为他的哲学图景增加了一些富有活力的要素。本文试图结合这一辩护策略,重新考虑证伪主义的理性主义内涵,并在此基础上勾勒出逻辑、心灵以及理性这三者之间如何相互关联的概念地图。
Popper’s falsificationism really solved the problem of Hume’s induction, the academic response is usually negative, people think that Popper’s implicit falsification implicitly induces induction. Allan Musgrave defended Popper in 2004, a move that defied Popper’s view to a certain degree, but also added some dynamic elements to his philosophical landscape. This article attempts to combine this defense strategy, reconsider the rationalism of falsificationism, and on this basis, outline the conceptual map of how the three relations between logic, mind and reason are related.