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20世纪90年代,研究拍卖理论的学者为美国和欧洲国家设计了电力拍卖以及各种不动产拍卖,使拍卖理论表现出强大的生命力,得到美国国家科学基金会的认可。本文阐述并分析美国联邦通信委员会(FCC)频谱许可证拍卖中串谋行为的风险规避问题,为我国的无线频谱许可证等公共资产进入国际领域提供一个可参照的、各方利益多赢的实例
In the 1990s, academics who studied the theory of auction designed electricity auctions and various real estate auctions for the United States and European countries, which gave the auction theory great vitality and was endorsed by the National Science Foundation. This article elaborates and analyzes the risk aversion of conspiracy in the FCC license auction and provides a referenceable and win-win example for public assets such as wireless spectrum licenses entering the international arena