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针对人的本质问题,马克思先后提到过两种有代表性的论断:人的本质是“有意识的生命活动”、人的本质“是一切社会关系的总和”。本文认为,这二者是根本不同的:前者回答的是个人何以成为“人”而不致沦为“非人”的问题.它的核心思想是类本质的对象化和实现;后者回答的是个人何以在历史中成为其自身的问题,它的核心思想是社会关系是具体的和历史的,随着个人历史存在的变化而变化。此外,关系范畴具有十分重要的哲学史意义:其一,它促成个人概念在哲学上的提出;其二,它在主体-客体的模式之外提供了主体-主体的全新模式。
According to the nature of mankind, Marx has mentioned two representative determinations successively: the nature of man is “the conscious life activity ”, the essence of man “is the sum of all social relations ”. This paper argues that the two are fundamentally different: the former answers the question of why an individual becomes a “human being” and does not become “inhuman.” Its core idea is the categorization and realization of the essence of the class. The answer to this question is why individuals become themselves in history, and its core idea is that social relations are concrete and historical and change with the existence of individual history. In addition, the category of relations has very important philosophical history significance: First, it leads to the philosophical proposition of individual concepts; second, it provides a new model of subject-subject beyond the subject-object model.