Abstract： Though “Comparative” rhetoricians Oliver and Kennedy placed Indian rhetoric on the rhetorical map， much remains undiscovered concerning their specific indigenous communicative practices. This essay introduces two such Indian traditions-- Nyāya， a philosophically based approach to persuasion codified by Hindus， and Sadharanikaran， interpreted by many as a Hindu model of communication. Nyāya， gradually developed a five-part “method” （Matilal） that defines arguments in terms of claims， reasons， and analogies. In a parallel dramatic tradition from Bharat Muni called Sadharanikaran， the receiver “not only accepts the message willingly but in the process derives genuine satisfaction and pleasure or Ananda”. This essay contrasts the two approaches with Aristotle’s more familiar ideas， and then offers some historical and current Indian arguments to illustrate rhetorical delivery shaped by Nyāya and Sadharanikaran， a glimpse into rhetorical performance within a rich non-Western tradition.
　　Key words： comparative rhetoric； persuasion； Nyāya； Sadharanikaran； Aristotle
　　中图分类号：H05 文章标识码：A 文章编号：1003-6822（2015）02-0088-11
　　“Comparative” rhetoricians Robert Oliver （1971） and George Kennedy’s preliminary work placed Indian rhetoric on the map of modern rhetorical studies， focusing primarily on Indian rhetorical related to Western terminologies. Lipson and Binkley’s collection Non-Western Rhetoric included two very interesting chapters on Indian rhetoric， both also focusing on attributes divorced from broad Indian rhetorical traditions. Recently， rhetoricians such as LuMing Mao （2003） encourage a comparative rhetoric more focused on and responsive to indigenous rhetorical traditions and theories—i.e. specific persuasive and communicative practices as understood and expressed within that culture. One such tradition， Nyāya， embodies a method of persuasion codified by Hindus， and developed within Buddhist， Jainist， Sikh， and later， Muslim interactions. While understanding Nyāya is crucial to understanding indigenous Indian argumentation， another tradition， interpreted by many as a Hindu model of communication， helps us also to envision an Indian concept of performance， related to the often overlooked， but foundational， element of Aristotelian and other rhetorics， “delivery.” Together they establish coordinates for Indian communication theory.
　　As in most cultures， persuasion in India was interpreted in terms of oral and dramatic traditions. Aristotle， in his Rhetoric， notes this logical connection： “When the principles of delivery have been worked out， they will produce the same effect as on the stage” （Rhetoric III 1 1413）. In India， the philosopher Gotama （550 BCE） is credited with systematizing oral reasoning， the philosophy of logic and rhetoric that became known as Nyāya. The word means“just”or“true，” as in a plumb line. Nyāya gradually became codified into a five-part“method” （Matilal， 1998） that defines arguments in terms of claims， reasons， and analogies （Lloyd “Culture，” “Rethinking，” “Rhetorical” “Learning’）. The rhetor， in the Hindu model， links observations to audience-shared analogies to create shared truth. 　　Analogy is crucial in the Indian context because， as Wimal Dissanayake， in Foundations of Indian Verbal Communication and Phenomenology observes， “While Western thinkers fashioned language into an instrument to explore and comprehend reality， the Hindus… tried to bypass it. Whenever Hindu thinkers and philosophers were confronted with the problem of explaining reality， they avoided logical and discursive language and made use of analogies and metaphors” （Dissanayake ， 1983： 43）.
　　In the Nyāya tradition， fruitful dialogue （vāda） occurs when individuals agree to argue as relative equals （in spite of caste or philosophical differences）. This tradition of oral debate implies its performance. J. S. Yadava describes a parallel dramatic tradition originating in the writing of Bharat Muni （2nd century B.C.E.） called Sadharanikaran （Sanskrit“simplification” （Yadava， 1987：165）. Central to the “theories of human communication” Nāt?ya （drama） and Nr?tya （dance）， Yadava compares it to “Aristotle’s concept of rhetoric” （Yadava， 1987： 167）： “in rhetoric， the communicator tries to persuade the receiver through dialogue and debate，” whereas， “[i]n Sadharanikaran the communicator communicates with the receiver/audience with the help of speech， gestures， and other visuals” （Yadava， 1987：167）. For Aristotle rhetors move audiences to their perspectives， but in Sadharanikaran， both sender and receiver have a part to play in a guru/?is?ya （teacher/student） relation. The sender， inspired by an idea， an emotion， or a moment of connection， encodes that inspiration in such a way that the receiver “not only accepts the message willingly but in the process derives genuine satisfaction and pleasure or Ananda” （Yadava， 1987： 167）. The main goal of Sadharanikaran is that， for the Hindu receiver， “the difference between the “I” and “Others” diminishes in his heart” （Yadava， 1987： 167）. In other words， while Nyāya draws speaker and respondent into shared perspectives， Sadharanikaran brings them to a level above that interaction， their mutual joy in that experience of communication. Sadharanikaran functions also above Aristotle’s catharsis， the joy （ānanda） we experience as we collectively share emotional， intellectual or spiritual connections.
　　Since both Nyāya and Sadharanikaran emphasize establishing one-ness between speaker and respondent （true commune-ication）， elements of both traditions can be witnessed in various recorded dialogues and interactions. This essay first describes these two approaches to communication， contrasting them with some of Aristotle’s more familiar ideas， and then offers some historical and current Indian arguments to illustrate rhetorical delivery shaped by Nyāya and Sadharanikaran， a glimpse into the concept of rhetorical performance within a rich non-Western tradition. The essay underscores the need to understand the uniqueness of each culture’s rhetorical and communicative practices from within their own traditions. 　　1. Nyāya and Sadharanikaran： Contrasting Aristotelian Rhetoric
　　Aristotle’s view of delivery expressed in his Rhetoric is focused on the rhetor’s point of view. Preferring to state the facts without adornment， he admits that due to “defects in the hearers，” （το? ?κροατο? μοχθηρ?α） delivery becomes a primary concern. On the one hand， his description delimits use of rhetoric to simply wow the audience： “The arts of language cannot help having a small but real importance， whatever it is we have to expound to others： the way in which a thing is said does affect its intelligibility. Not， however， so much importance as people think. All such arts are fanciful and meant to charm the hearer” （?παντα φαντασ?α τα?τ? ?στ?， κα? πρ?? τ?ν ?κροατ?ν） （Rhetoric III 1 1409-12）. On the other hand， persuasion works through logos， ethos， and pathos， and rhetors should also remember that “the whole business of rhetoric [is] concerned with appearances” （τ?? περ? τ?ν ?ητορικ?ν ο?χ ?? ?ρθ?? ?χοντο? ?λλ? ?? ?ναγκα?ου τ?ν ?πιμ?λειαν ποιητ?ον）. He predictably suggests a middle way—to neither annoy nor delight respondents （μ?τε λυπε?ν μ?τ’ ε?φρα?νειν） （Rhetoric III 1 1405； 1406）.
　　While Indians also stress factual importance， the idea that persuasion involves “appearances” designed to reach a “defective” audience is completely foreign. Indian concepts of public debate developed independent of Western concept of rhetoric. As Dissanayake remarks， “Indians [use] language in conformity with logic that support[s] their thinking and which was markedly different from Aristotelian logic” （Dissanayake ， 1983： 45）.
　　Ancient India then developed its own descriptive and proscriptive way of arguing， Nyāya， described in the philosopher Gotama’s Nyāyasūtra （Gotama， 1990； Lloyd， 2011， 2013， 2007a， 2007b）. The Sūtra provides guidelines and philosophical justification for debate， and its methods were adopted by all six schools of orthodox Hindu philosophy， and by Buddhist and other Indian sects. This school of thought emerged as early as the 500s BCE and became codified by the second century CE. It continues today as “new” or Navya-Nyāya. Claims and reasons are common in both Western and Indian approaches （Lloyd， 2011）， but Nyāya applies a relevant analogy rather than a general premise （Lloyd， 2007b）.
　　In the Medieval Simhasana Dvatrimsika， the people speak persuasively with their king after a beneficent act：
　　Unmindful of your own ease， you endure pains every day for the sake of your people 　　[Because] It is your nature.
　　Like the tree taking the sun to provide shade. （Simhasana Dvatrimsika 161-2）
　　Rhetorically， the audience reaches across caste boundaries to both compliment and admonish their ruler， reminding him of his duties while congratulating him on his practice of them. Such use of analogy appears in Western rhetoric， but it did not combine claim， reason and analogy into one dominant model.
　　This combination of statement， reason， and analogy seems to combine Aristotle’s enthymeme and paradigm （Lloyd， 2007b）. Enthymemes are a rhetorical form of the syllogism， and though， as Carol Poster （1992） vividly reveals， scholarship differs as to what this means， we note that the enthymeme often appears in Aristotelian examples as two-part statements consisting of a claim and a reason （Grimaldi， 1998； Emmel， 1994）. A modern example serves to illustrate：
　　Graduate Teaching Assistants should get health benefits
　　Because they provide fundamental service to the university.
　　A third premise is always implied but， according to Aristotle， speakers may omit any element they assume their audience already believes （Rhetoric I. 2. 1357a line 23， p. 28； Burnyeat， 1996： 100）.
　　People who provide fundamental service should get health benefits.
　　As characteristic of rhetorical arguments， the premises and conclusion are probable， and could be stated otherwise （Bitzer， 1959： 408）. For Aristotle， the paradigma （examples） fill mostly supportive roles （Rhetoric II. 20. 1394a 9-13， p. 134-135）. Often they complement the second premise， i.e. examples of valuable GTAs.
　　In contrast， Uma Krishnan （2007）， a Hindu from India， applies claim， reason， and example differently. She once offered， “You and I were meant to have this conversation， because life has brought us together， like two strangers on a train； we may have different destinations， but nonetheless been fated to share the same car for some limited time.”
　　Rather than an instance related to one of the premises， Krishnan’s （2007） analogy joins the premises. It reflects what Matilal （1998） calls the “Nyāya Method，” shown in full below：
　　Hypothesis （pratij?ā）： The hill （paks?a） is on fire （sādhya）
　　Reason （hetu）： Because there is smoke （hetu）
　　Examples （dr?s?t?ānta）： Like in a kitchen （sāpaks?a） [Positive example]
　　Unlike a lake （vipaks?a） [Negative example]
　　Re-Affirmation （upanaya）： This is the case
　　Conclusion （nigamāna）： The hill is on fire. 　　In short， the goals of both Sadharanikaran and Nyāya are to remove the distance between I and Other because that distance is in itself an illusion caused by misunderstanding our common existential reality. In Sadharanikaran， Yadava notes，“the complex concepts and ideas are simplified by the speaker （source） with illustrations and idioms appropriate to the understanding of the listeners （receiver of messages）” （169）. Likewise， in Nyāya， the dr?s?t?ānta or analogy， defined by Gautama as a “thing about which an ordinary man and an expert entertain the same opinion” （NS I.1. 25 p. 11） is connected to a reason “the means for establishing what is to be established by the homogenous or affirmative character of the reason” （NS I.1.34 p.14）. Like Sadharanikaran’s illustrations and idioms， the dr?s?t?ānta exemplifies and makes clear the argumentative connections. Thus， using similar methods， drama， dance， and rhetoric， three key cultural forms of communication， are all to serve， in Hindu thinking， the greater goal of removing the obstacles to self- understanding and to bring us to a state of comprehension of and joy in our fundamental unity.
　　2. Aristotle， Gotama， Muni： Differing Rhetorics
　　It is useful to step back now and view each of the three approaches discussed thus far. Greek-influenced rhetoric places the most emphasis on the rhetor as the one who chooses the best available means of persuasion to suit an audience. It is purely language based. According to Aristotle （1984）， the rhetor uses enthymemes and examples to move the audience to the rhetor’s point of view， and to act and/or think accordingly. The form then is “transmittal” in its one-way， rhetor-to-audience nature and， as Aristotle asserts， is best suited for political and social speeches， as well as law.
　　Nyāya posits a safe space where interlocutors are relative equals； it is designed for both formal and informal debate and idea presentation. Interlocutors agree to seek answers together （vāda--“fruitful and fair discussion”） using the method’s claim， reason and analogy， so it too is language based， though the analogy adds an important mentally visual element. Since interlocutors were invited to question each other’s Nyāya， the method is dialogic. It is also ritualistic， since it relies on rules and cultural commonplaces to function. Originally， it was used for dialogues between religious leaders and rulers and debates among schools of thought （Lloyd， 2013）， but like Aristotelian rhetoric in the West， has become common in Indian culture. Its goal is moks?a， the release of the interlocutors from ignorance， doubt， and illusion that ultimately leads to liberation from cycles of death and rebirth. 　　Sadharanikaran developed from a teacher student model， but this includes speakers， actors， and poets in the teacher’s role. It includes all modes of communication—gesture， costume， dance， bodily movements， staging， etc.—and is thus multimodal. It is transmittal only in the sense that the speaker/enactor begins the process， but interactional in terms of results—rasa， a bodily and spiritual sharing of the message. It was used to solidify and continue society and culture， and helped people to act collectively. The goal is for both rhetor and audience to enter a state of joy and communal experience. The rasas became a fundmental aspect of Indian life. Figure 2 below summarizes these ways Nyāya and Sadharanikaran differ from Aristotelian rhetoric.
　　3. Examples of Nyaya/Sadharanikaran
　　Though he only applies the notion of Sadharanikaran to one example of modern communication in rural India， knowledge of both it and Nyāya are needed to explain Yadava’s references to argumentative traditions in India. He notes that in rural areas， communication often takes place in what he refers to as “gossip groups” （not a derogatory term）—informal gatherings in tea shops， street corners， hooka bars， etc. In these exchanges， he notes： “One person makes a point， someone strongly contradicts him， others support one view or the other expressed during the course of discussion or gossip session； occasionally， all burst into laughter and then proceed with their chit chat. They are Sahridayas [practitioners of Sadharanikaran] having Rasa” [communion of emotional state of joy and commonality].
　　Sadharanikaran explains their burst into laughter and resultant communality； the Nyāya method explains their procedures. Though in the Nyāyasūtra the Nyāya method is more formalized， one can see its outline in the gossip group’s exchanges： “Discussion （vāda） is the adoption of one of two opposing sides. What is adopted is analyzed in the form of the five members [the Nyāya method]， and decided by any of the means of right knowledge， while its opposite is assailed by confutation…” （NS I. 2. 42 p. 19）. The overall “opposing sides” structure of the gossip group debates are clearly Nyāya in design， and while Yadava does not provide the details needed to see if the method itself is applied， he does mention that “participants often cite folklore or other cultural stories to make their points， thereby simplifying difficult and complex ideas and concepts…. Things expressed in cultural idioms and in terms of local experience are easy to comprehend and remember” （Yadava ， 1987： 170）. Nyāya’s dr?s?t?ānta are likely used in such contexts. 　　Nyāya/Sadharanikaran may be seen in other media as well. What follows are three examples from different media， the first from the dramatic tradition， the second from a guru’s presentation， and the third from a book from a renowned Indian scholar.
　　In Canadian/Indian Deepa Metha’s （2006） award-winning film in English， Fire， one can witness a Nyāya argument where the filmmaker applies a visual analogy to a claim and reason. The film describes the love that develops between two Hindu sisters-in-law named Sita and Radha （names of two Hindu goddesses who took human form in primary Hindu myths）. As the film notes， there is actually no word in Hindi for their developing lesbian love， so the topic remains quite controversial. Metha （2006） not only names the women as goddesses， but taps into the original mythological stories surrounding the two figures. In the original stories， Sita’s faithfulness to her husband Rama is tested when she is kidnapped and held by a demon for some time before her husband could save her. To prove she did not have relations with the handsome demon， she submits to be burned alive， and emerges unharmed because she is pure. The hideous custom of burning wives with their dead husbands stems from this story.
　　In the film， it is Radha （Shabana Azmi） who faces a similar trial. The morning after her husband Ashok （Kulbhushan Kharbanda） catches her and Sita （Nandita Das） in bed making love， he confronts her， condemning her actions as sin in need of repentance. Viewers earlier learn that the married couple have not had sex in years， since the husband believes desire is to be overcome in this life. He confronts Radha saying， “Desire brings ruin， I know that.” Radha responds， “Brings ruin？ Does it Ashok？ You know that without desire I was dead. Without desire there is no point in living. And you know what else？ I desire to live； I desire Sita.”
　　Her argument is Nyāya in form：
　　“I desire to live.”
　　Because “without desire I was dead.”
　　The film provides the analogy her statements lack. Her husband tries to violently seduce her， then pushes her away， and her sari catches fire. She scrambles to put it out， but her husband simply gathers his mother and leaves her to burn， a reference to the trial of the goddess Sita now， for the viewer， a heartless attempt at wife immolation. The film cuts to a scene from Radha’s childhood which occurs periodically during the film， where， when she asks her mother to go to the ocean， her mother replies that if you look at a field of flowers long enough， you can see the ocean. In previous scenes frustrated， this time the child Radha squints her eyes and happily exclaims， “I can see the ocean， I can see it！” The film fades to black. 　　The Nyāya formulation is now complete：
　　Pratij?ā： “I desire to live. I desire Sita.”
　　Hetu： Because “without desire I was dead.”
　　Dr?s?t?ānta： Like when I saw the ocean in a field of flowers.
　　As the younger Radha experienced liberation when she desired to see， and saw， the ocean， so the elder Radha is liberated by desire for， and love of， Sita. The filmmaker， using traditional Indian argumentation to tap into the sacred traditions of India， turns them to whole new ends as the two women reunite in a temple， expressing the sacredness of their relationship. Radha， like Sita in the mythological story， has survived the trial by fire. As viewers， we experience the women’s liberation， called by the film to a state of ānanda， a celebration of our commonality as human beings in our struggles with truth and ignorance， despite cultural and national differences.
　　In second example， one modern guru， whose followers number in the hundreds of thousands， Sri Sri Ravi Shankar （2007）， uses a familiar formulation to ancient interlocutors in his spoken argument for the connectedness of the universe， captured on a YouTube video： “The universe is beginningless and … endless. Full of changes. It goes on and on in a cycle of life. And that by which this universe is made up of… that is the divine. That is God. Like when a movie is projected on a screen. All that figure in the movie is [sic] made up of one light， isn’t it？ One light. That light itself became all those heroes， heroines， whatever….” （Sri Sri Ravi Shankar， 2007）
　　Basically， there are three argumentative moves—a claim， a reason， and an analogy. When we get to the dr?s?t?ānta of the movie， we see the point he is making：
　　Pratij?ā： The universe is beginningless and endless， full of changes and the cycle of life
　　Hetu： Because of one divine source
　　Dr?s?t?ānta： Like a movie projected on a screen
　　As in many informal Indian arguments， there is no negative dr?s?t?ānta， and there are more details to his argument， but basically the example clarifies and holds together his message： one light becomes many things upon a movie screen； one divine light becomes the universe. More than an illustration， it anchors and reiterates his point， framing his discussion. His argument is Nyāya in design and directed toward Sadharanikaran’s rasa. As the audience envisions his analogy， the experience of seeing films transfers to the common life experience， and his argument works on us much like a film works on us—we experience our commonality and thus the joy of the shared experience of illumination. 　　His point is not proven， any more than it could be proven from an Aristotelian point of view， which would assume the general un-provable premise， “The One divine source is beginningless and endless， full of changes， and the cycle of life.” However， the Nyāya formulation offers the image of the movie’s projection as concrete way to unify the respondents through shared experience. Because of this， the conclusion is not esoteric， and it may make sense on a different level， what Suzanne Langer （1957） calls the level of resonance. We experience the point on an intuitive， rather than purely cognitive， level. The use of analogy makes the arguments supra-rational.
　　Hindu philosophy posits that the world is a combination of matter （prakr?ti） and energy （prān?a）. The image of the film projected on screen makes this idea tangible， just as the scientific image of a light “wave” makes the idea of light tangible. As Dissanayake observes， “The Indian mind sees language as an instrument serving the function of classification and， hence， unable to grasp the deeper reality which is by nature indivisible” （Dissanayake， 1988： 42）. We need the image to understand that which is indescribable， and what is indescribable becomes intelligible through listening and relating to the image. This bringing together of humans once thought as separate but now seen as part of one whole， rasa， leads us to ānanda.
　　A third example appears in the work of the widely published Indian writer Deepak Chopra. Though he most often uses Western forms of argument， in his book How to Know God， he uses the image of “waking up” as a central argumentative move. It is so crucial he denies it is even an analogy： “Here all metaphors and analogies end， because just as a dream gets exposed as illusion when you wake up， so being eventually unmasks karma. Strip away the unreal and by definition all that remains must be real. The soul’s journey isn’t a game， a chase， or a gamble. It follows a predetermined course toward the moment of waking up” （Chopra， 2000： 168-169）.
　　His argument applies the simile of waking up， and could be formulated in a Nyāya pattern in the following manner：
　　Pratij?ā： Karma （the world of activity--the unreal） is unmasked by Being
　　Hetu： Because of realness （a characteristic of Being）
　　Dr?s?t?ānta： Like waking （from a dream）
　　He does not say that one way to look at the unmasking of karma is the example of waking up， which would imply an Aristotelian/Western approach； he asserts that the two experiences are qualitatively the same thing， sharing fundamental properties to the extent that the comparison is actually not metaphorical. In Nyāya， the analogy IS the argument. 　　Chopra （2000） seems to intuitively know when to use such an argument. This notion of waking up is central to his arguments， and if his readers follow his reasoning， they could actually experience this unmasking of karma in their own lives， a moment of moksa. Respondents may also experience a movement outside of even this realization， to rasa， an identification with all of humanity and the inexpressible joy of elevated interaction. It is a double joy， that of release and that of experiencing release together.
　　4. Conclusions： Some Insights into Indian Rhetoric
　　In conclusion， Indian culture， Hindus interacting with Buddhist， Muslims， Jains， and other groups， developed a formula for a truth-sharing debate mechanism （Nyāya） that stands apart from Western Aristotelian traditions. While we in the West use analogies for arguments， we did not develop a similar systematic model. We also did not develop such an elevated notion of the role of rhetoric as a path to physical and spiritual liberation. Performance or delivery， begrudgingly admitted by Aristotle， is defined by Nyāya as following a method in terms of presentation， but the goals of rhetorical interaction was not imposing the will of the rhetor but rather inviting the respondent into dialogue and shared understanding.
　　In Sadharanikaran， the communicator’s role also differs in that it is to emphasize commonality of human experience and to reveal both personal and communal truth， which is， after all， in this perspective， one truth. The expected result would be for speaker and listener to become Sahridayas experiencing Rasa， the dissolution between I and other and a sharing of joy and commonality.
　　Communication scholars like Yadava， Dissanayaki， and Adhikary have identified Sadharanikaran as a general Indian communication model， and readily describe what might be referred to in the West as rhetorical delivery. However， Indian rhetoric is not limited to forensics， epidiectics， or polemics； the distinction between rhetoric and dialectic is non-existent， and one model of thinking was promoted for use within all realms of human interaction. Together with Nyaya， Sadharanikaran indicates that the goal of rhetorical delivery and communication in the Indian context is not only liberation from doubt and misunderstanding， but also the experience of shared humanity and the unity of all beings. In India， rhetorical practice then assumes the most elevated status as a means to spiritual and metaphysical liberation. 　　References
　　Aristotle. The Rhetoric and Poetics of Aristotle [M]. Roberts， W. R. & Bywater， I. （trans.）. New York： Modern Library， 1984.
　　Bitzer， L. F. Aristotle’s enthymeme revisited [J]. Quarterly Journal of Speech， 1959，（4）： 399-408.
　　Burnyeat， M. F. Enthymeme： Aristotle on the rationality of rhetoric [A]. Rorty， A. K. （ed.）. Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric [C]. Berkeley， CA： University of California Press， 1996： 88-115.
　　Chopra， D. How to Know God： The Soul’s Journey into the Mystery of Mysteries [M]. New York： Three Rivers Press， 2000.
　　Dissanayake， W. Foundations of Indian verbal communication and phenomenology [A]. Dissanayake， W. （ed.）. Communication Theory： The Asian Perspective [C]. Singapore： Asian Mass Communication Research and Information Center， 1988.
　　Emmel， B. A. Toward a pedagogy of the enthymeme： the roles of dialogue， intention， and function in shaping argument [J]. Rhetoric Review. 1994，（1）： 132-149.
　　Grimaldi， W. M. A. The enthymeme as the method of rhetorical argumentation [A]. Enos， R. L. & Agnew， L. P. （eds.）. Landmark Essays on Aristotelian Rhetoric [C]. Mahway， NJ： Lawrence Erlbaum Associates， 1998： 95-114.
　　Ingalls， D. H. H. Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic [M]. Delhi： Motilal Banarsidass， 1988.
　　Krishnan， U. Personal Conversation [Z]. 5 April， 2007.
　　Langer， S. Philosophy in a New Key： A Study in the Symbolism of Reason， Rite， and Art [M]. Cambridge， MA： Harvard University Press， 1957.
　　Lloyd， K. Culture and rhetorical patterns： mining the rich relations between Aristotle's enthymeme and example and India's Nyaya Method [J]. Rhetorica， 2011，（1）： 76-105.
　　Learning from India's Nyāya rhetoric： debating analogically through Vāda’s fruitful dialogue [J]. Rhetoric Society Quarterly， 2013，（3）： 285-299.
　　A rhetorical tradition lost in translation： implications for rhetoric in the ancient Indian Nyaya sutras [J]. Advances in the History of Rhetoric. American Society for the History of Rhetoric， 2007a.
　　Rethinking rhetoric from an Indian perspective： implications in the Nyaya sutra [J]. Rhetoric Review. 2007b，（4）： 365 – 384.
　　Matilal， B. K. The Character of Logic in India [M]. New York： State University of New York Press， 1998.
　　Mao， L-M. Reflective encounters： illustrating comparative rhetoric [J]. Style， 2003，（4）： 401-425.
　　Metha， D. Trial by Fire Films Inc [Z]. Kaleidoscope Entertainment， 2006.
　　Muni， B. The Nāt?ya?astra [M]. Rangarharya， A. （Trans.）. New Delhi： Munshiram Manoharlal， 2010.
　　Oliver， R. T. Communication and Culture in Ancient China and India [M]. Syracuse， NY： Syracuse University Press， 1971.
　　Poster， C. A historicist recontextualization of the enthymeme [J]. Rhetoric Society Quarterly， 1992，（2）： 1-24.
　　Shankar， S. S. R. Sri Sri Ravi Shankar [OL]. YouTube. Posted 2/8/2007. 3：50-4：29.
　　http：//www.youtube.com/watch？v=9HwcaSIBN5U
　　Gotama. The Nyaya Sutras of Gotama [M]. Vidyābhūs?an?a， M. M. （trans.）. Delhi： Motilal Banarsidass， 1990.
　　Yadava， J. S. Communication in India： the tenets of Sadharanikaran [A]. Kincaid， D. L. （ed.）. Communication Theory： Eastern and Western Perspectives [C]. New York： Academic Press， 1987.
　　作者简介：Keith S. Lloyd，男，博士，美国肯特州立大学副教授，国际修辞传播学会理事。主要从事比较修辞学和女性修辞学的研究。
　　通讯地址：Kent State University， Stark， 6000 Frank Ave. NW， North Canton，OH 44720
　　E-mail： kslloyd@kent.edu
　　（责任编辑：刘东虹）