本文旨在建立股东责任最优选择模型。如果投资者要监控经营者，这些监控者应该是剩余财产的债权人（股东）。随着股东对公司投资的增加，公司的价值和监控工作都随之增加。当清理财产耗费太大时，靠临时负债吸收直接投资，成为一种筹资手断。然而，如果财产无法查清，在这种制 The purpose of this paper is to establish an optimal selection model for shareholder responsibilities. If investors want to monitor the operators, these monitors should be creditors (shareholders) of the remaining assets. As the shareholder’s investment in the company increases, the value and monitoring of the company will increase. When the cost of clearing up the property is too large, direct investment is absorbed by the temporary liabilities and becomes a kind of fund raising. However, if the property cannot be ascertained,