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本文以我国2004~2006年A股上市公司为样本,研究了终极控制人控制权私人收益与上市公司债务期限结构的关系。实证检验结果表明,当终极控制人获取私人收益的动机较强时,银行为防范贷款风险,有可能仅向企业提供短期借款。但是,当终极控制人为国有企业或行政级别较低的地方政府时,其私人收益主要表现为转嫁政策性负担以实现社会目标或政治目标,由此导致国有企业与政府的密切关系,而这种关系使得国有企业更容易进入融资市场,获得更多长期债务融资这种稀有资源。减少政府干预行为,完善国家制度建设,有助于债务融资治理机制的发挥,进而促进现代企业制度的建设与完善。
In this paper, a sample of A-share listed companies in China from 2004 to 2006 was studied, and the relationship between private controller’s ultimate return and listed company’s debt maturity structure was studied. Empirical test results show that when the ultimate controller has a strong incentive to obtain private benefits, the bank may only provide short-term loans to the enterprise in order to prevent the loan risk. However, when the ultimate controller is a state-owned enterprise or a local government with a lower administrative level, its private income mainly manifests itself in passing the policy burden to achieve social or political goals, which in turn leads to the close relationship between the state-owned enterprises and the government. The relationship makes it easier for state-owned enterprises to access the financing markets and to obtain more scarce resources for long-term debt financing. Reducing the government intervention and perfecting the construction of the state system will help the debt financing governance mechanism to play an active role in promoting the construction and improvement of the modern enterprise system.