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这篇文章建议对自20世纪80年代以来国家预算过程中以色列政治官员和行政官员的互动进行博弈分析。20世纪70年代和80年代期间,新的结构性条件催生了新的正式的和非正式的规则,这些规则削弱了以色列政治官员相较于财政部的谈判地位。1985年的以色列经济稳定计划不仅改变了正式的政治制度,同时也创造了新的非正式制度。在新的环境下,以色列政治官员几乎不可能在政治谈判过程中向财政部发出挑战。鉴于财政部官员了解以色列的内部流程和公众舆论,政治官员不太可能试图给人留下一种他们愿意挑战财政部官员的印象。我们认为,这种情形最终会导致以色列社会福利的次级最优均衡,因为在参与者之间,权力的均衡青睐于占主导地位的一方——财政部的官员。
This article suggests a game analysis of the interaction between Israeli political and executive officials in the national budget process since the 1980s. New structural conditions created new formal and informal rules during the 1970s and 1980s that undermined the negotiating positions of Israeli political officials over the Ministry of Finance. The 1985 Israeli economic stabilization plan not only changed the formal political system, but it also created a new informal system. In the new environment, it is almost impossible for Israeli political officials to challenge the Ministry of Finance during the political negotiations. Given Treasury officials’ knowledge of Israel’s internal processes and public opinion, it is unlikely that political officials will try to give the impression that they are willing to challenge Treasury officials. In our opinion, this situation will eventually lead to a sub-optimal sub-equilibrium of Israeli social welfare, as the balance of power favors the dominant party, the official of the Ministry of Finance, among the participants.