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本文回顾了主流理论中关于垄断社会成本的模型与估算方法,包括基于哈伯格三角形、X—效率理论以及竞争性寻租模型的研究的前沿进展。在此基础上,分析了国内外估算行政垄断社会成本的研究进展。发现国内学者在估算行政垄断的哈伯格三角形、垄断租金以及企业内部效率损失方面,由于方法不同而导致了估算结果的巨大差异。这对反行政垄断是非常不利的。其根本原因是,不同研究对经典寻租模型的理解和对租金耗散的界定存在偏差,甚至有误解,所使用的方法落后于寻租经济学的理论进展。而运用泰勒尔的规制合谋理论来研究行政垄断的租金问题或者社会成本可能是一个更好的视角。
This paper reviews the mainstream theories on monopoly social costs models and estimation methods, including the forefront of research based on the Haberburg triangle, X-efficiency theory and competitive rent-seeking model. On this basis, the research progress of estimating the social costs of administrative monopoly both at home and abroad is analyzed. It is found that there are huge differences in the estimation results due to the different methods used by domestic scholars in estimating the Haberburg triangle of administrative monopoly, monopoly rents and the loss of internal efficiency of enterprises. This is very unfavorable to the anti-administrative monopoly. The fundamental reason is that different studies have some misunderstandings on the classic rent-seeking model and the definition of rent dissipation, even misunderstood. The methods used lag behind the theoretical progress of rent-seeking economics. It may be a better perspective to use Tyler’s collusion theory to study the rent problems or social costs of administrative monopoly.