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该文采用2009年10月至2014年12月间所有在我国深圳证券交易所创业板首次公开上市的412家公司的面板数据,基于专用性投资的调节效应视角,运用广义最小二乘法(FGLS),研究了控股股东类型、风险投资参股和超额控制与代理风险之间的关系。研究发现:第一,风险投资的参股可以显著缓解创业企业控股股东超额控制的代理风险;第二,整体而言,集团控股股东出于谋求战略收益的动机,会加强对创业企业的超额控制。与资产公司控股创业企业相比,风险资本对集团控股创业企业的控制权治理更为有效;第三,在专用性投资水平较高的情况下,风险资本因其具有专业化的管理水平,能够建立一整套专用性投资的风险防范及监控机制,对集团控股股东代理风险的治理监管效果更好。
Based on the panel data of all the 412 companies listed on the GEM of China’s Shenzhen Stock Exchange from October 2009 to December 2014, this paper uses the generalized least squares (FGLS) method based on the regulatory effect of the special-purpose investment, , Studied the relationship between the controlling shareholder type, risk investment shares and excess control and agency risk. The findings are as follows: First, the participation of venture capital can significantly mitigate the agency risk of the controlling shareholder of venture capital enterprises. Second, as a whole, the controlling shareholders of the group will increase the excess control of venture capital out of motivation for seeking strategic benefits. Venture capital is more effective in controlling corporate governance of start-up groups than venture capital companies. Thirdly, under the condition of higher level of special-purpose investment, venture capital can, because of its specialized management level, The establishment of a whole set of risk prevention and control mechanism for special-purpose investment has a better effect on the governance and supervision of the controlling shareholder’s agency risk of the Group.