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本文利用重复博弈理论,引入Harsanyi相互信念系统研究了双寡头企业价格联盟稳定的信念临界点及影响信念临界点的因素,并进一步分析了双寡头价格联盟稳定性的条件。研究结果表明,双寡头联盟企业在单阶段博弈情况下的不同策略所获得的收益、市场需求、企业的生产能力以及联盟价格与背叛价格之比都影响着企业联盟稳定的信念临界点,而贴现因子和相互信念水平影响着联盟的稳定性。
In this paper, repeated game theory is used to introduce the Harsanyi mutual belief system to study the stable belief threshold of duopoly firms and the factors that affect the critical point of belief. The conditions for the stability of duopoly oligarchs are further analyzed. The results show that the profit, market demand, production capacity of enterprises and the ratio between the union price and the betrayal price of duopoly firms under the single-stage game all affect the firm belief threshold of the alliance, and the discount Factors and mutual beliefs affect the stability of the coalition.