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随着煤炭市场的规模化、集中化的出现,煤炭商利用其市场力哄抬煤炭市场价格的现象自然会出现,而煤炭价格的上涨又会带来发电上网价格、供电销售价格的上涨。可见,控制煤炭商市场力可以从源头有效管理能源价格问题。本文设计了煤电的差价合约模型,然后运用Cournot寡头垄断模型论述差价合约对煤炭商的生产行为与发电商的决策行为的影响,运用Stackelberg寡头垄断模型论述发电商之间合作对其效应的影响,并通过Shapley原理给出了发电商之间合作利益分配模型。通过算例模拟发现,煤电差价合约可以促使煤炭商增加生产量,降低煤炭市场价格,稳定销售量,而发电商的合作行为使这种效应更加明显。
With the large-scale coal market, the emergence of coal, coal use their market power to drive up the coal market prices will naturally occur, while the rise in coal prices will bring electricity generation, power supply sales prices. Therefore, controlling the market power of coal traders can effectively manage the energy price issue from the source. This paper designs the coal-electricity CFD model and then uses the Cournot oligopoly model to discuss the impact of the CFD on the coal producer’s production behavior and the power plant’s decision-making behavior. The Stackelberg oligopoly model is used to discuss the impact of the power suppliers on their effects , And gives the distribution model of cooperative profit among generators by Shapley principle. The simulation results show that the coal-electricity CFD contract can promote the coal producers to increase the production volume, lower the coal market price and stabilize the sales volume, and the co-operation behavior of the generator makes the effect more obvious.