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本文分析了非法收购及养殖户的行为选择,以及养殖户与地方政府博弈的均衡策略。结果表明,当地方政府提供给养殖户的补贴不低于防疫成本与非法收购价之和时,才能防止养殖户将牲畜尸体卖给非法收购商;当补贴与相关成本满足不同条件时,处罚和随意丢弃、处罚和合理回收分别是地方政府与养殖户的均衡策略。“弃猪”事件的案例分析表明,处罚和随意丢弃是当前我国地方政府和养殖户策略选择的普遍结果。
This article analyzes the behavior of illegal acquisitions and farmers, as well as the equilibrium strategy of the game between farmers and local governments. The results show that when the local government subsidies provided to farmers is not less than the sum of the cost of immunization and the illegal purchase price to prevent farmers from selling their dead bodies to illegal purchasers; when subsidies and related costs meet different conditions, the penalties and Discard arbitrarily, punishments and reasonable repossessions are the equilibrium strategies of local governments and farmers respectively. Case analysis of Abandoning Pig incident shows that punishment and arbitrarily discarding are the common results of the current strategies of local government and farmers in our country.