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对特定时段最高人民法院《1.9规定》实施效果进行分析,发觉存在“起诉率偏低而赔付率偏高”问题。究其原因,限制诉讼方式规定起了较大的负面作用。起诉率偏低反映符合条件的适格投资者大部分缺席诉讼,被告违法成本低,凸显平等主体投资者在实现诉权上的不平等;而赔偿率偏高则说明仅仅部分参与诉讼的适格投资者得到高额甚至是超额的补偿,这实际上又引起诉讼内外实体上的分配不公。因此,在实施股票发行注册制的当下,立法应当及时修改这种限制诉讼方式的规定,通过推行证券公益诉讼,或者合理改进民事诉讼法中人数不确定代表人诉讼制度并建立相应实施机制来减少投资者的诉讼成本,使其能够平等、公平地实现诉权。
Analysis of the implementation effect of the “1.9 Provisions” of the Supreme People’s Court at a specific time period reveals that there is a problem of “low prosecution rate and high pay-off rate”. The reason, the law restricting litigation played a larger negative effect. The low litigation rate reflects the majority of eligible investors who are eligible for defaults and the defendants have low costs of law enforcement, which highlights the inequality of equal rights owners in realizing the right of action. A high compensation rate indicates that only part of the eligible investors who participate in the litigation Who received high or even excessive compensation, which in fact caused unfair distribution of the entity inside and outside the litigation. Therefore, at the moment of the implementation of the stock registration system, the legislation should be amended in time to limit such restrictions on the lawsuit, through the implementation of securities public interest litigation, or to improve the lawsuit system of the number of uncertain representatives in the Civil Procedure Law and to establish the corresponding implementation mechanism to reduce Investors litigation costs, so that they can be equal, fair and the right to appeal.