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信息非对称性导致供应链低效率,使其不能协调。当军工企业具有批发价格和收益、收入共享比例决策权,而仓库具有隐匿边际成本信息和订购量决策权时,军工企业可设计一个对仓库私有成本信息的不可观测性付出代价来激励仓库的收益共享机制,结果发现虽然会因获得真实的成本信息而付出了甄别费用,导致其利润低于信息对称下的收益,而仓库却可以从中获得大于信息对称情况下的额外收益,供应链收益低于信息对称下的收益。但各方收益随着仓库订购成本的增加而减少,可在原收益共享机制的基础上,适当降低批发价,加大仓库的订购量,使军事供应链重新协调。
Asymmetric information leads to inefficient supply chains that can not be coordinated. When the military industry has the decision-making power of wholesale price, income and income sharing ratio, and the warehouse has the hidden marginal cost information and the order quantity decision-making power, the military enterprise can design a non-observability of warehouse private cost information to pay for the revenue sharing Mechanism. The result shows that though the cost of screening will be paid for obtaining the real cost information, the profit of the warehouse will be lower than that under the information symmetry, and the warehouse can gain more profit than the information symmetry, and the supply chain income is lower than the information Symmetric earnings. However, the revenue of all parties decreases as the cost of warehouse ordering increases. On the basis of the original revenue sharing mechanism, the wholesale price can be appropriately reduced, the order quantity of warehouses can be increased, and the military supply chain can be re-coordinated.