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经典代理理论认为,激励和风险之间存在权衡关系,经深入分析发现事实并非总是如此。由于企业所有者控制企业管理层存在监督和激励两项基本措施,随着风险的加大,监督成本和激励成本都会加大,所有者控制措施的选择取决于两种成本的比较。激励与风险之间的关系曲线,由于受到监督的制约,两者并非负线性关系。基于我国上市公司样本的实证研究结果表明,我国上市公司管理层补偿与风险之间存在倒“U”形关系,管理层补偿绩效弹性与风险之间存在倒“U”形关系。同时,监督对我国上市公司管理层补偿存在负向影响,这种负向影响随着风险的逐步增大而加强。
The classical theory of agency holds that there is a tradeoff between incentives and risks. It is not always true after deep analysis. Due to the existence of supervision and incentive by the owner of the enterprise, there are two basic measures: supervision and incentive. As the risk increases, supervision costs and incentive costs will increase. The choice of owner’s control measures depends on the comparison of the two costs. The relationship between incentive and risk curve, due to supervision constraints, the two are not negative linear relationship. The empirical study based on the sample of listed companies in our country shows that there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between compensation and risk in the management of listed companies in our country. There exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between managerial compensation performance flexibility and risk. At the same time, the supervision has a negative impact on the management compensation of the listed companies in our country. This negative influence is strengthened with the gradual increase of risk.